The study “Legitimizing the think-tank turn: The transformation of Chinese media in the digital era” by Haiyan Wang and Liangen Yin from University of Macau analyzed, through a case study of a Chinese provincial commercial newspaper in southeast China the “think-tank turn” in Chinese media. Broader implications from the case study are also looked at.
Because of the dissemination of digital technologies, Chinese media, like media elsewhere, has had to transition to survive. A popular way in China is what is known as the “think-tank turn”, where newsrooms are turned into policy research hubs, and journalists into analysts.
The think-tank turn started in 2013 with the recession of legacy media. First newsroom think-tank was the Liaowang Think-tank for the national news agency Xinhua. Soon after, People’s Daily established People’s Think-tank, Guangming Daily Guangming Think-tank, Hubei Daily Changjiang Think-tank, and Caixin Media Caixin Think-tank. By 2022, there were at least 50 media organizations with think tanks, making it a national phenomenon.
By definition, think-tanks are research organizations that provide ideas to policy-makers and influence policymaking, according to Stone (2007). Think tanks are part of a wider “policy community” (Schlesinger, 2009). The difference between media and a think tank is that media is detached from the policy reality and functions as a watchdog, while a think tank is an insider.
Chinese journalism has been analyzed mainly by two perspectives: one is studying the relationship between media, market, and state; the other being about paradigm shift and journalistic professionalism. Part of it is the two-masters argument, where the media has to simultaneously adhere to the Party line and the “bottom line”, meaning the market.
With digitalisation, the relationship between media and the State has become more complicated, with subsidies playing a more and more significant role in total revenues. Indeed, while the media generation from early 1990s to 2011 was termed “Reform and Opening Up Generation”, being critical and idealist; the “Digital generation” beginning from 2012 is more passive and more worried about their job providing a living.
For methodology, Suchman’s contructive framework of legitimacy is central, and the research questions are:
RQ1: What is the process of the Chinese media’s think-tank turn?
RQ2: How do the media organizations justify the cognitive/pragmatic/moral legitimacy of think-tank practices?
RQ3: How to theoretically explain the legitimization process within the Chinese context?
The framework of this study is a case study of “Paper N” (PN), a provincial commercial newspaper in Southeast China. There were three reasons for choosing this paper. One is that the crisis experienced by PN is typical of Chinese newspapers. Two, PN organized one of the earliest think tanks based on media and is widely recognized (Cai and Cai, 2019; Cao and Li, 2022) as a model of success.
Third, it is one of the most commercially successful Chinese newspapers and has established a reputation through conducting investigative reporting, and critical journalism tradition is strong there. This means that the transformation of PN is particularly indicative of the think-tank turn.
The authors conducted interviews. The first set of interviews was conducted from April to June 2016, when PN was in the beginning of setting up a think-tank. The second set was from December 2019 to September 2020. By then, PN’s think tank had entered a mature stage. A total of 31 journalists were interviewed, and the interviews were from 30 minutes to about two hours long.
In addition, the authors gathered materials relating to PN, including internally-circulated documents shared by the participants, public speeches by executives and managers, self-reflective writings by PN reporters and editors in trade journals, and media/social media publicity materials.
The analysis was guided by the principles of grounded theory and guidelines of thematic analysis. The authors separately analyzed and coded the materials then compared the analyses with each other, and compiled the research report based on RQs.
According to the results, PN’s think tank turn, like in many cases, was directly caused by the financial difficulties it experienced in recent years. PN used to be one of the most profitable media outlets in China, with advertising revenue of 1.8 billion yuan annually, and about 5000 staff and a readership of 1,6 million around the country.
For PN, the year 2012 was the turning point. Advertising revenue dropped by 50% and one third of the readership disappeared. This led to a search for alternative revenue sources. The political atmosphere also tightened, which had implications for PN, since it had a strained relationship with the government, having been dubbed the “public conscience” for its investigative-style reporting.
In 2016, PN announced a new slogan: “Be the most influential media think-tank in China”, replacing “Be the best newspaper in China”. By 2020, PN announced that it had completed the think-tank turn and newsroom journalists were, by then, relatively comfortable with their dual role as journalists and researchers.
There was cognitive legitimization. PN also sought to legitimize the think-tank journalists. It had a tradition of choosing a “Journalist of the Year”, but since 2016, it was not only investigative journalism projects and such that were rewarded, but also think-tank research projects. This set up an example for other journalists to follow.
Journalists and editors also were asked to add their think-tank roles in their business cards to reinforce their new roles. PN also used its media channel to promote the changes with humorous first-person accounts making use of word plays and emojis.
At the individual level, some journalists responded positively, but others were doubtful and hesitant. The multi-tasking nature of the new work was questioned: journalists had to display much flexibility in switching between different task types and work roles. They also might encounter identity challenges when introducing themselves to other people.
Pragmatic legitimization was also a factor – how journalists gain tangible benefits from their new roles. For example, the salary was increased by having a basic fixed salary and a bonus flexible based on the newspaper’s economic situation and the journalists’ performance.
The bonus salary was nearly half of the total salary in good years, but during economically challenged years, it was nearly non-existent, causing some to panic. However, with the think-tank turn, economic situation bettered again leading to increased salaries.
To foster the think-tank turn, journalists were asked to focus on at least one research topic to develop it into a think-tank product that a potential client might buy. This meant the acquisition of multiple new skills to be competent in the new role. Some saw that as a burden, but others took it as an opportunity to gain new skills.
In addition, pragmatic legitimacy was fostered by the journalists gaining a perception of elevated social status. Traditionally, as a local newspaper, PN journalists had a lower status in the hierarchy than journalists working for, say, state media. Suddenly, the journalists were not in the periphery of elite institutions like universities but part of these circles.
Moral legitimacy, where instead of self-interested goals, public interest is in the fore, was also analyzed. Here, there were challenges: rarely could the interviewees point out how the think-tank turn benefited the society. In the cases where they were asked this, they often confused public interest with the interest of the client or the government.
In fact, there was a telling quote in this regard: “For us, the traditional media, it is important to continue to play the role of the custodians of public interest. Therefore, we need to be better skilled to coordinate with the Party and facilitate the accomplishment of the Party’s core work”. Here, the connection between public interest and the interest of the Party is not questioned.
Also, the journalists attributed their job satisfaction to a government source. The journalists saw working with state bodies as an opportunity to form alliances with the government and network with government officials. Hence, the think-tank research often reflected the state agenda.
Not all embraced the think-tank turn and the things that came with it. Some felt their professional autonomy being sacrificed or compromised and even threatened to resign. To these journalists, the think-tank turn is a demise of journalism and to the role of a public conscience. This suggests that while journalists can be convinced of cognitive and pragmatic legitimacy, it is harder to convince them of moral legitimacy.
In conclusion, the increased income and job security coming from the think-tank turn came at the expense of compromising journalistic autonomy and the public interest. Journalistic resistance to this was not uncommon, but often occurred on a small scale. This is because journalists face an increasingly precarious job market.
The research contributes to existing scholarship in journalistic legitimacy, showing it has several layers. Second, it adds to understanding interplay between media, market and politics in the digital era, especially Chinese media, which had long been criticized as the “throat and tongue” of the government (Zhao 1998).
Third, the authoritarian context differs markedly from Western media, and the study adds to the debates of digital transformation of media. It shows that technology is not always on the side of democracy.
The article “Legitimizing the think-tank turn: The transformation of Chinese media in the digital era” by Haiyan Wang and Liangen Yin is in Journalism. (free abstract).
Picture: Wai Tan, Shanghai, by Li Yang.
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