The study “Character Skepticism and the Virtuous Journalist” by Joseph Spino was an article about journalistic ethics, particularly Virtue Ethical Journalism (VEJ) and its criticism coming from the viewpoint called character skepticism. This viewpoint contends that character traits and virtues are not effective enough in guiding people’s behavior, and these traits should be minimized in ethical thought (Doris and Stich 2005).

Character skepticism does not only apply to VEJ, but touches all aspects of our lives. There is a wealth of literature on the topic from the past two decades, and VEJ takes character skepticism seriously and proponents of VEJ have mustered a defense to the criticism.

Many responses defending VEJ defend it from a more general viewpoint that applies to general theory of virtue ethics, but the author argues that such responses are insufficient in defending VEJ, as VEJ is not simply the idea that journalists should develop virtue, but there are specific journalistic virtues and a higher emphasis on behavior. 

Character skepticism, in short, is a viewpoint that people do not behave in the way more familiar theories of character would have us expect. In the eyes of character skeptics, trait-relevant behavior is significantly disrupted by features that do not seem relevant to moral decision-making.

Milgram’s famous obedience to authority experiment is discussed here. In this experiment, the participants were driven to administer (secretly fake) electric shocks to other participants when ordered so by authority figures. While this may appear to support the presence of obedience to authority as a character trait, obedience plummeted when orders were delivered by phone – which may be a trait irrelevant situational factor. 

Journalists, of course, are not normally ordered to electrocute people, but they may encounter other moral dilemmas coming from authority figures. Other past studies also suggest presence of trait irrelevant behavior, such as Zhong et al., 2010, where lower light levels promoted dishonest behavior. These are also relevant to VEJ, as they suggest that situational, trait irrelevant factors affect moral behavior and similar to  these might be encountered by journalists. 

However, one might argue that virtue is the very thing that shields its possessor from inconsistencies coming from trait irrelevant features. To this argument, the author argues that most people are not in a virtuous state, and even then, being near it or virtuous does not necessarily shield one from inconsistent behavior.

Aristotle, in Nicomachean Ethics, claims that most pre-virtuous people suffer from internal conditions of disharmony, and even if a person is virtuous inclined (that is, does the right thing), temptations may cross their mind. People who do the right anyway are called “continent” (enkrates), and people who do not “incontinent” (akrates). These are described as permanent conditions, not one-of events. 

According to the author, VEJ is particularly vulnerable to the challenges posed by character skepticism compared to traditional virtue ethics. Consequently, the author focuses on a subset of virtues: truthfulness, trustworthiness, and courage and mentions others briefly.

Truthfulness for a journalist is an expectation of accuracy when recounting facts and non-factual claims, rather than an absolute prohibition of lying. Indeed, Quinn (2007) notes, “lying used as a tool for meeting the ends of justice is sometimes paramount to truth-telling”.

Here, the Zhong et al (2010) study about light levels might be troubling: while journalists likely will not suddenly start manufacturing stories out of thin air when a light bulb goes off, but combined with the delicate balance on truth that journalists must balance on as shown by Quinn, the existence of such vulnerability to trait irrelevant should be troubling, as such conditions might occur often and combined with an opportunity for personal gain might lead to dishonesty.

Trustworthiness is important to journalists as they are expected to be reliable and trustworthy sources of information to check against abuses of power, for example. Trustworthiness, of course, is not unique to journalism, but it functions in it a bit differently than in other fields where it is more of professional-client direct relationship. 

One can imagine that trustworthiness might be derailed when an authority figure, in person, asks a journalist to do something unethical like breaking someone’s trust, like in the Milgram experiment. And trust, once broken, is hard to repair.

Courage is a favorite among Aristotelian virtues, and can also be seen in its absence, cowardice, and excess, rashness. VEJ also sees it as a central one. For example, a journalist might risk going to jail to protect source confidentiality. 

Milgram experiment might be relevant here too: courage is required to resist taking orders that are unethical at the risk of social disapproval or personal embarrassment – a low risk. Yet in the experiment many failed to display courage. 

Beyond these three, a broader perspective exists. For example, MacIntyre (1981) argues that virtues should be seen as broader thing than just individual professional virtues – that a tradition is needed where practitioners fit their experiences to a larger whole.

There are several responses to the challenges presented by character skepticism that have been cited against it, but that the author considers insufficient. These are the Rarity Response –  that possession of true virtue is rare, so inconsistencies should not come as a surprise. Second is Education Response – acknowledging the temptations presented character skepticism and seeking to inoculate the journalists against them. 

Third, there is the Narrow Virtues Response. Here, journalists are not expected to display virtue consistently in their lives, but to simply follow them as journalists to be good journalists. However, the author argues that narrow traits could be just as easily threatened by situational factors.

The author, while clearly a proponent of character skepticism, claims to not be a “scorched earth” one and still sees value in VEJ. However, he also argues for an adjustment. For one, the empirical insights from character skepticism should be taken into account and build organizational solutions that support virtue. 

The author, in conclusion, states that the debates between the proponents of VEJ and character skepticism are not solved anytime soon, but states that VEJ should re-evaluate its responses to character skepticism, or its view of character and virtue altogether.

Finally, the author states that the field of moral psychology benefits both virtue proponents and detractors. VEJ proponents in particular would benefit in revising their theoretical commitments to avoid susceptibility to skepticism.

The article “Character Skepticism and the Virtuous Journalist” by Joseph Spino is in Journal of Media Ethics. (free abstract).

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